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The roots of African political, social, economic, and military instability can often be found in colonial and Cold-War
historical circumstance. This has made regional conflict resolution a problem so complex that it defies single-state
solutions. The time has arrived, however, when Africans no longer can afford to look to external patrons to settle
regional conflicts. Africans are increasingly aware of this change and exhibit a growing determination to solve their
own problems.
The recent history of Sub-Saharan Africa is marked more by the existence than by the absence of conflict within and
among states. And although a comprehensive method for dealing with these conditions remains elusive, one element of
the problem has undergone significant change. With the return of the Republic of South Africa to the family of African
nations, the assets and experience of that country can now be considered when seeking new ways to preserve peace in
the region.
This article advances a concept for a new model for deterring and settling regional conflicts. The model is based on an
analysis of the major source of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa--instability--and on the many conflicts that have
occurred despite attempts to settle them. It reflects as well lessons learned by African military forces when confronted
with the duties and responsibilities of peacekeeping, whether under the auspices of the UN or of a regional
organization. Finally, the potential contribution of South Africa to new forms and functions for conflict resolution can
foster new perspectives for governments frustrated by their long-standing inability to deter or resolve ethnic, religious,
economic, or politically motivated conflict in the region.
Challenges of Statehood
External powers played a critical role in shaping modern Africa, and this to such an extent that it has been said, "while
Africans created and continue to create their own history, they do so under conditions that, in many cases, they do not
control."[1] The most dramatic phase of external involvement on the continent began with what is now called "the
scramble for Africa" in the 1880s and 1890s.[2] It resulted in the advent of European colonialism and ended, as far as
most Africans are concerned, with majority rule in South Africa in April 1994. Many Africans view the legacy of the
colonial era as the root cause of the conflict and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa today.
To a degree, this attitude is warranted. Colonialism was inherently (though variably) exploitative. Colonial powers
implemented social and economic policies that were generally contradictory to the norms of African life, yet the
colonial experience was too short to thoroughly enculturate African populations to European norms. This more or less
set the stage for future conflict. After decolonization, Africa was left with artificial political boundaries which in many
cases divided homogeneous peoples. Countries that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s were ruled by "assimilated"[3]
African elites who were frequently more concerned with their own advancement and their own continued relationship
with the former powers than with the political and economic progress of their own people.[4] Stressing unity at the
expense of political pluralism, a number of these new leaders adopted an autocratic approach to governing. This, in
turn, stifled prospects for a "loyal opposition." Opposition was often brutally suppressed, provoking conflict among
opposition parties within the same country.[5]
In conjunction with the political evolution, the colonial powers left behind a region already economically
marginalized. This problem was compounded in individual countries by financial mismanagement and poor
development strategies. African countries did not have the financial means for development, and frequently lacked
leaders with sufficient vision to provide well for the future. This led to the accumulation of vast debt which has been

virtually impossible to service and which in turn has resulted in highly dependent or even collapsed economies.[6]
This colonial legacy--factional politics and unsustainable economies--is what most Africans refer to when discussing
their problems. Educated Africans generally believe that "most of the festering regional crises that torment the
continent . . . are rooted in one way or another in ill-considered decolonization strategies driven by metropolitan
interests."[7]
Despite a modest but encouraging increase in commitment to market economies, transparency in governance, and
progressively realistic development strategies, many serious problems afflict Africa today.[8] The most important
include very limited resources, unrealistic expectations and lack of opportunity, nationalist and secessionist aspirations,
inept or oppressive leadership, and proliferation of arms. Massive urbanization overwhelms national abilities to
generate employment and can lead to illegal immigration to what some perceive as greener pastures. In extreme cases,
these problems have led to "failed states."[9]
Other problems that will adversely affect Africa in the 21st century include environmental degradation, an increasing
incidence of AIDS, the possible large-scale increase of drug marketing, and the fact that the continent is prone to
natural disasters and to endemic diseases. These problems by themselves are not conducive to stability; when added to
the aforementioned political and economic heritage, the mixture becomes volatile. And unfortunately, violence has a
considerable precedence on the continent. The fact that independence was won by many Africa countries through armed
struggle reinforces a tendency to resort to arms to solve problems.
Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa
Parts of the Sub-Saharan region of Africa have been subjected to conflict almost continuously during the post-colonial
era. The first case of significance occurred in the former Belgian Congo. Belgium, the colonial metropole, was
unwisely persuaded to grant independence in mid-1960 without any substantive preparation of the small national elite
for its new role.[10] At the same time, Belgium sought to retain control of much of the colony's economic
infrastructure. The result at independence was immediate breakdown of order, which led to chaos.
The UN deployed a force to try to preserve a fragile national integrity, which proved to be an extremely difficult task.
While the initial mandate given UN forces was to help the central government, during its first year there were as many
as four governments claiming legitimacy, each faction backed to some degree by outside powers that were equally at
odds.[11] The UN force, despite all these difficulties, eventually put down the separatist attempts, and held the Congo
together. Success, which came at a very high cost in civilian and military lives, also cost about $2 billion to support the
deployment of nearly 20,000 UN military personnel over a four-year period.[12]
Partly as a result of the "Congo experience," the UN shied away from deploying armed military forces for purposes of
peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa until 1989, when it became involved with the transition to independence in
Namibia.[13] In the interim, Pan-African efforts at conflict resolution had shifted to the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), which was established in 1963 to deal with conflicts on the African continent. The Africans had to use their
own means, which were extremely limited, to give substance to operations supported by the OAU. In its one major
attempt at peace operations (Chad, 1980-81) the OAU proved entirely unequal to the task.
There are many continuing situations of instability on the African continent, and if current trends prevail, prospects for
long-term tranquillity in many areas seem bleak. For instance, in Guinea-Bissau, opposition to the current government
is becoming more militant, which has contributed to rising tensions with Senegal. In Nigeria, an increasingly
vociferous (though brutally suppressed) opposition is trying to organize international sanctions against a seemingly
interminable military regime. Sadly, though realistically, genocide and civil war in Burundi remain equally
interminable prospects. Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), has not stabilized after the Kabila takeover
to the extent where peace prevails. Current political infighting creates the potential for possible further upheaval in this
war-ravaged country. In Sierra Leone the civil war continues.[14] And no one can predict with any degree of assurance
what other conflicts that have been suppressed for now will erupt into violence without much warning.
All those interested in peace in the region--Africans, the UN, other nations--should take serious cognizance of the
potential for continued regional instability. In light of this conclusion, it makes sense to refine existing conflict

resolution mechanisms, particularly those of the UN and regional organizations, in preparation for renewed conflict.
Past and current efforts at conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance should provide relevant lessons for those who
would improve the political, economic, and social conditions of many in the region. Such an analysis is the essential
prerequisite for designing a military model that could support future conflict resolution measures.
Challenges of Regional Peace Operations
Sub-Saharan African military personnel have participated as observers and staff officers during United Nations peace
operations throughout the world.[15] Additionally, African countries have been willing participants in peace operations
in Africa and elsewhere, all of which, whether successful or not, have provided a wealth of experience in both troop
deployments and the conduct of peace support and humanitarian relief operations.
Africans have, of course, encountered a variety of problems in conducting peace operations. Many of these have been
identified; some were cited by participants in a South African Institute of International Affairs conference held in July
1995.[16] The problems encountered by African peacekeepers while conducting operations outside of Africa are both
similar to and different from those experienced while on operations on the continent itself. Both categories are
pertinent here, since Africans will continue to conduct both varieties. Operations outside the continent have highlighted
problems such as these:

. Africans engaged in peace operations have often concluded that they were treated by partners from other contingents
as second-rate soldiers.[17] Consequently, international organizations have tended to deny Africans substantial
leadership roles in multinational peace operations, and whether provided by other organizations or by their own
countries, Africans have deemed logistic support provided them as inferior.[18]

. Lines of communication from African countries to their contingents deployed abroad are always a problem. The
longer the lines, the more costly the operation becomes, especially when sizable forces are deployed. Apart from the
Africans' unfamiliarity with natural and cultural environments outside of Africa, social aspects such as feedback to
one's own country, mail, and remuneration are always affected adversely. As is true of leaders everywhere, African
leaders are always concerned with explaining to their own people casualties, mission creep (where this leads to
protracted deployments), and ambiguous mandates.[19]

. The biggest challenge that Africans face is the perception that multinational organizations may abandon them when a
situation appears to be taking a turn for the worse.[20] Africans recognize the risk entailed in reliance on other
organizations for financial and logistics support, and they fear the possibility that they could be left to their own
devices in a dangerous situation.
One could reasonably argue, therefore, that Africans should preferably be deployed in peace operations only on their
own continent, where they will be closer to home and will find themselves in a more familiar environment.[21]
However, serving on their own continent is not without its own array of problems:

. Economic decline is the rule rather than the exception in the region. Africans frequently encounter a "mismatch
between desired ends and available means or resources to achieve them."[22] The charter of the OAU makes
substantial provision for conflict resolution,[23] and sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have now included
regional security in their protocols.[24] All that is lacking is sufficient material resources to support these initiatives.
This deficiency can be overcome in part by improved managerial competence within regional and sub-regional
organizations. These organizations do receive funds for peace activities;[25] available resources could be used more
efficiently and effectively.

. Cultural differences can affect "the ability of Africans to put aside national and individual prejudices in order to
achieve the necessary cooperation."[26] An example is evident in the OAU's first peacekeeping attempt in Chad in
1981. Africans tend to view this effort as a failure because "member states were divided on the mandate." The OAU

lacked funds, which led to the contributing nations supporting their own contingents logistically, which caused the
OAU to lose hands-on control of the operation.[27] Africans will have to address this issue comprehensively if future
efforts at cooperation are to succeed. Dynamic leaders with considerable international credibility (such as Nelson
Mandela of South Africa), are now emerging on the African continent; the solution to this problem lies firmly in their
hands.

. Lack of interoperability and poor serviceability of equipment, lack of uniform peace-operations doctrine, and varying
standards of expertise and performance among African armed forces can hinder peace operations. These are secondary
to the problems mentioned above; once identified for correction, they are relatively easy to overcome. If Africans are
correct in their perception that "the Western world is not sensitive to African concerns and affairs," they will have to
overcome these problems and become the solution themselves.[28] In this light, it must be said that although Africans
have at times been known for their failures, they have achieved much success during their participation in peace
operations. There is reason for confidence in African success in the future.[29]
Effective military operations on the African continent require military contingents that are skilled in specialties such as
tracking, anti-mine warfare, low-intensity conflict, and law enforcement activities.[30] This makes African militaries
ideal for conducting operations in this environment, since many African military establishments have retained these
skills from recent liberation struggles.
It seems reasonable to suggest that one major factor has been absent from efforts to bring about a more stable
continent. This factor is the Republic of South Africa, which until recently has been excluded from any intensive
interaction with other African countries on this issue. South Africa represents a possible, albeit a partial, alternative to
the resource dilemma.
South Africa: The Key?
Before 1994 South Africa was very much isolated from the greater international community, owing to the social
policies of the minority-run government. However, on 27 April 1994, when South Africa held its first truly democratic,
all-inclusive election and the majority party was voted into power, a new era opened as South Africa was welcomed
back into the world and African communities.[31]
The electoral process had barely been completed when the debate was started as to what South Africa's role would be
in helping to solve some of Africa's problems. With South Africa having a reasonably strong economic base, at least in
comparison to other African countries,[32] and a powerful and proven military machine,[33] the South African
potential for good seemed unlimited. This optimism was well-founded for three reasons: established governmental
mechanisms were already in place in South Africa; the attitude and approach of the South African government toward
other African countries had changed, and the manner in which the international community viewed South Africa had
changed.
The new government of South Africa that came to power in 1994 inherited a well-functioning, Western-style
administration, and the national economy, although inhibited by sanctions, was stable and much stronger than that of
any other African country.[34] The military was well equipped and experienced, and it offered the new government
exemplary professionalism, nonpartisanship, support, and loyalty, contributing immeasurably to the smooth transition
to majority rule.[35] The South African military establishment has considerable expertise in the African operational
environment, and by 1994 it had successfully transitioned into a truly national defense force. Its multi-racial, multiethnic features have been enhanced and are very relevant to its participation in peace operations in Africa.
The South African government currently pursues a policy of cooperation, transparency, and friendship toward its
African counterparts.[36] This is very much evident in the support that the South African government has provided,
since 1994, to countries such as Angola, Rwanda, and Mozambique.[37] This foreign policy is clearly articulated in a
"South African Draft White Paper on Defence," which states that South Africa will strive to seek defense cooperation
with other states as a priority and strengthen security and defense fora in the region where applicable.[38]
South Africa still must solve many domestic problems before the transition is complete. The challenges that it faces

include internal ethnic conflict,[39] threats of secession,[40] land redistribution, integration and rationalization of
seven military forces,[41] implementation of housing reform, equality of education, and affirmative action.[42] These
problems must be addressed and a firm domestic base established before South Africa can engage effectively in
providing aid to the rest of Africa on a large scale.
South Africa, however, is faced with a "Catch 22" situation. It cannot afford to neglect completely activities within
Africa while attempting to meet its internal challenges. One authority argues that this condition is based on three key
facts.[43] First, the support that South Africa can expect to receive from organizations such as the European Union and
the World Bank is influenced by its willingness to cooperate with neighboring countries. Second, instability in the
region could exacerbate problems such as illegal immigrants, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking, which would have
an obviously negative effect on South Africa. And third, the rest of the world tends to assess South Africa's prospects
in the light of trends and events elsewhere in the region. But regardless of whether conditions for regional involvement
are the best they could be, South Africa is prepared now to do its part to contribute to regional stability.
A South African Strategy
South Africa would be wise under the circumstances to adopt a two-phased concept for helping the rest of Africa: a
short-term strategy that can be applied almost immediately, and a long-term strategy that can be activated after its
political transition has been completed.
Short-term activities would convey South Africa's good intentions in Africa to the international community, establish
good relations with its African counterparts, and familiarize South Africa with Africa's problems with a view to
perhaps alleviating some of them. Short-term support within the region that would not jeopardize its domestic
programs could have South Africans:
Support conflict resolution on the African continent by participating as negotiation and mediation teams with the
OAU or with sub-regional organizations.
Render support and share knowledge and experience in the domain of environmental preservation.
Participate actively in regional and sub-regional organizations with a view to increasing managerial competence.
Establish fora in which South Africa can share the experiences of transitioning to a democracy with other
nations in Africa that are moving in a similar direction.
Share technology in the fields of medicine, mining, agriculture, and veterinary science.
Conduct military assistance training programs, with the proviso that assistance would have to be provided in
such a manner as to not jeopardize South Africa's own ongoing military integration process.
Foster selective military weapon system and equipment sales at reasonable prices and then only in support of the
peace effort on the continent.
With these support mechanisms in place in the short term, South Africa would signal its commitment to regional
conflict resolution and would give substance to the proposed "peace operations" model described below.
The Long-Term Strategy
While it is far too soon to try to predict all aspects of the second phase of South Africa's strategy for helping other
African nations, one element of it seems almost self-evident: sponsor a model for military participation in peace
operations. A comprehensive model would draw on the lessons learned described above and include military tasks and
preparations required before, during, and after deployment in such operations. The need for the model reflects the
awareness that:
Africa has a history of conflict and instability for which there is no end in view.
There is an increasing willingness among Africans to solve their own problems.
A number of African countries have extensive experience in peace operations.
Many factors inhibit Africans in conducting successful peace operations on their own continent, the most
pressing of which is a general lack of resources.
South Africa has the means and can be the catalyst, if so inclined, for successful future peace operations in
Africa.

This proposed military model addresses the issue of resources, both financial and human. Financial resources are
needed for equipment, remuneration of participants, and operating costs. These financial costs can be covered to a
large degree by African countries committed to regional stability by purchasing equipment at reasonably low prices
from, inter alia, South Africa;[44] by acquiring serviceable but compatible, redundant equipment from the United
States;[45] and by managing the funds made available to the OAU and sub-regional organizations more effectively
and efficiently than has been possible in the past.[46] Here, South Africa can play a leading role.
Africa probably should not, however, attempt to maintain a standing peace force, for it could become an extremely
expensive proposition, one that could have a variety of negative effects on all involved.[47] Instead, this model
suggests that each country should maintain its own military force, emphasizing training for peace operations so as to be
able to contribute effective forces to common efforts. Countries would be scheduled on a rotation basis to have military
elements on stand-by, to be able to react rapidly to any contingency. Commitment would be under the authority of the
UN and sanctioned through the OAU, ensuring that sufficient human resources would be available at all times. The
effectiveness of this system depends on how well five of its component features are designed and managed:
preparedness, force structure, training, early warning, and command and control, each of which is discussed below.
"Preparedness" in this model relates to the availability on short notice of personnel and equipment--in effect, to a
willingness to maintain personnel and materiel at the state of readiness required for rapid deployment in a crisis. The
question of resources is a difficult issue with few totally satisfactory solutions to the personnel, materiel, and financing
needed to develop and sustain the model. Once resources have been made available, however, it will be possible to
prepare to respond to ongoing and future conflicts.
In terms of force structure for the model, a light infantry brigade should suffice as a rapid deployment force that could
manage most conflicts in their initial stages. Equipment for a brigade would be broken down into sets for three
battalions (each having its own headquarters) and a brigade headquarters. This equipment would be positioned and
preserved in four different countries in Africa, making any conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa accessible to at least a
battalion-sized force on short notice. Equipment sets for one of the three battalions could be located in east Africa,
west Africa, and southern Africa respectively. The equipment for the brigade headquarters would be located at a fourth
location, where it would be maintained and readily accessible to the strategic lift needed to transport it.[48]
The initial force authorized and employed by the OAU to contain a conflict would use the equipment stored at the
positioning point closest to the conflict. Should the need arise, this force would be supplemented by others using the
remaining designated sets of equipment. The success of the process rests on maintaining and replacing this equipment
to ensure preparedness. Managing this effort should become the responsibility of the conflict resolution cell of the
OAU, although considerable additional structuring would be required before that entity could effectively perform such
a role.
While attention to equipment and personnel are important, this plan also requires intensive peace operations training.
Training would be divided into two categories: training within the armed forces of each participating country and
combined training involving regional authorities and forces of several countries. Individual country training is the
responsibility of each national command authority and will not be addressed here. Combined training in peace
operations, however, is of paramount importance to success. Uniformity of doctrine is essential during multinational
operations, which will be the form of most future peace operations in Africa. Various authorities have considered and
advocated the establishment of a Pan-African Peace Training Center, a measure that would enhance the ideas offered
here.[49]
A further useful development would be an "African Peace Operations Council" comprised of instructors drawn from
all the major military colleges and academies in Africa. Such a council could periodically meet to set up uniform
doctrine, ensure that all the militaries follow common doctrine during their training, work through lessons learned
during peace operation deployments, and revise the doctrine if necessary. The chairmanship of this council could
rotate among participating countries. This measure may be less costly than a more permanent system.
Early warning of an impending crisis is the fourth essential feature of the model. If availability of resources,
meaningful training, and professional preparedness are to bear fruit, then it is imperative that an effective early warning

system be put in place. The military component of the OAU's conflict resolution cell should set up an information
center at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and use a variety of means to collect and analyze information
and keep OAU management informed daily of developing problems. Useful sources include selected military attachés,
sub-regional organizations and their security cells, and even the intelligence services of various countries if they are
accessible. Admittedly, constructing such a capability will be an enormously complex, difficult, and unprecedented
task. It will take time and much patience to build it, but its potential usefulness is so great that the effort is inherently
worthwhile.
An important characteristic of an early warning system is to have forces available to deploy for peace operations on
very short notice. To meet this objective, the OAU should negotiate the establishment of a stand-by duty roster with
member countries. Countries could be asked on a rotating basis to place on permanent alert a maneuver force of
battalion strength, prepared for deployment within a specified time. Support elements could be scheduled in the same
manner. A brigade headquarters would be assembled by the OAU when and if the need arose.
The most significant aspect of scheduling would be to keep track of all available military transport aircraft in Africa so
as to be able to move peacekeeping forces expeditiously. This requirement implies maintaining contact with regional
civilian air fleets and external patrons with military airlift capabilities that could be leased if necessary. Establishing
and maintaining these agreements and the readiness information itself would be another task of the OAU-based
information center.
The last issue to be addressed by the proposed model is that of command and control. It is imperative that the UN
sanction all peace operations undertaken on African soil to lend legitimacy to the operations. The model suggests that
the OAU, under the auspices of the UN, will always assume direct responsibility and authority for such operations.
The OAU can authorize sub-regional organizations such as SADC and ECOWAS to conduct these operations on
behalf of the OAU.
The model assumes that the OAU would never divorce itself completely from any African peace operation, because it
is the only organization that represents the entire continent. Military commanders would be appointed by the OAU, and
these commanders in turn would be responsible to report back to the OAU directly, or via the sub-regional
organization when that is the applicable sponsor. The OAU, in turn, would keep the UN informed as to the status of the
peace operation. This link is extremely important, especially if additional external support is needed, which the UN
would be able to authorize.
Conclusion
Sub-Saharan Africa faces many difficult challenges which often lead to conflict. The latter, in turn, produces
tremendous human suffering. External powers are not likely to offer substantial assistance in the future for conflict
resolution; indeed, they have been exhibiting increasing "donor fatigue." Africans realize this and are willing to deal
with their problems themselves. However, they lack the resources and the structures to solve many of the problems.
While it is unlikely in the intermediate future that Africans will find sufficient resources without at least some outside
assistance, there are ways in which existing means could be adjusted for greater effectiveness in conflict resolution.
The Republic of South Africa, recently welcomed back into the African family of nations after years of pariah status,
may have the potential to alleviate some of the resource problems. Although South Africa still has many domestic
issues to resolve before it can provide large-scale assistance, it can provide limited support almost immediately. This
may be sufficient to encourage Africans to conduct their own peace operations on the continent. In the long term,
resources which South Africa brings to the community could support the model for peace operations outlined here.
The proposed model addresses only the military component of peace operations. The premise is that if resources,
adequately trained forces, preparedness, early warning, and (above all) command and control are used effectively, then
the model has the potential for early and successful military responses to conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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45. Specifically, equipment made available through the US military's "Excess Defense Articles" program and policy.
46. This refers to organizations such as the UN and the European Union, and countries such the United States and
others that have an interest in Africa.
47. A National Peacekeeping Force, comprising elements of all the military and police forces prevalent in the country
at the time, was established in South Africa in 1993. The idea behind this concept supposedly was to provide a neutral
security force to aid the transition to majority rule. It was a failure and resulted in this force being disbanded before the
transition. The author is of the opinion that the flaws in that force will be inherent in any standing African force.
48. The site and the necessary equipment for such an organization are already available. Exercises regularly held there
could be used in an integrated fashion to train all potential African Brigade staff officers.
49. See Metz and Butts, p. 36.
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